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NOTES
INCLUDING THE TRANSGENDERLESS AT

WORK:
A COMPARISON OF TRANSGENDER
EMPLOYEES AND TRANSGENDER
STUDENTS AS PLAINTIFFS
INTRODUCTION

In 1983, Ann Hopkins sued her employer, the accounting firm Price
Waterhouse, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.' She
claimed she had been denied the position of partner primarily on the
basis of her gender.2 Hopkins went on to win her case in both the
district and circuit courts. After the Supreme Court heard the case in
1988, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins became one of the most cited gender
discrimination cases.4 Not only did the Court establish a new burden of
proof-namely that the employer had to show that the decision
regarding employment would have been the same if sex discrimination
had not occurred 5-but it also introduced the legal relevance of sex
stereotyping as a subset of sex discrimination in the workplace. The
Supreme Court held it impermissible to advise a female candidate for an

1.
2.
3.
4.

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231-32 (1989).
Id. at 232.
Id.
See, e.g., Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303 (D.D.C. 2008); Mary Anne C.

Case, DisaggregatingGenderfrom Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law

and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1995) [hereinafter DisaggregatingGenderfrom
Sex] ("[A] wide variety of cases and fact patterns not generally seen to have much to do with one
another can all be better understood if organized for purposes of analysis under the rubric of gender;

these include cases involving sex-specific clothing regulations, stereotypically feminine behavior by
both men and women, sexual harassment of both women and men, jobs seen to require either
predominantly masculine or predominantly feminine traits, single-sex education, sexual orientation,
and transsexuality.").

5. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242.
6. See id. at 250-5 1.
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accounting partnership to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely,
dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled,. . . wear
jewelry," and go to "charm school." 7
The double bind that women experience in workplace environments
that favor typically male-gendered characteristics was astutely observed
by the Price Waterhouse Court: "[a]n employer who objects to
aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait places
women in an intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they
behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not." 8 Thirty years later,
this "catch 22"9 remains pervasive and particularly concerning for
effeminate men.' 0 It seems that men "who exhibit[] feminine qualities
[are] doubly despised, for manifesting the disfavored qualities"" deemed
feminine and for "descending from [their] masculine gender privilege to
do so."l 2 This unfortunate reality illustrates the "continuing devaluation,
in life and in law, of qualities deemed feminine." 3
In her article, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual
Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist
Jurisprudence, Mary Anne Case argues that "unfortunately, the world
will not be safe for women in frilly pink dresses-they will not, for
example, generally be as respected as either men or women in gray
flannel suits-unless and until it is made safe for men in dresses as
well."1 4 One example of gender favoritism she offers is that of voice
pitch: in society high-pitched voices are generally considered to be "both
feminine and out of favor, while deep voices are associated with a wide
range of desirable qualities, from authority to sexiness."' 5 "[M]en with
high-pitched voices [tend to be at a] disadvantage-in the employment
market, in court, in politics, and elsewhere."' 6
In dealing with gender stereotypes in the legal sphere, however, the
courts seem to be making progress.' 7 Hopkins marked a "third

7. Id. at 235, 256, 258 (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117
(D.D.C. 1985)).
8. Id. at 251.
9. Id.
10. See DisaggregatingGenderfrom Sex, supra note 4, at 58.
11. Id. at 3.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 7.
15. Id. at 28.
16. Id. at 29.
17. See id. at 30-31 (explaining that with and since the Price Waterhouse decision, the Court
gradually broadened the concept of impermissible sex stereotyping).
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generation of sex-stereotyping cases in the courts." 18 While "the first
generation focused on the assumption that an entire sex conformed to
gender stereotypes; the second [generation assumed] that individual

members of the sex did; [and] the third. .. penalized [individuals]
because their gender behavior did not conform to stereotypical
expectations."' 9
In the meantime, schools too have had to learn to adjust to gender

nonconforming students especially because such students frequently find
themselves among the chronically victimized.20 Indeed, it has been
recognized that "[t]hose young people whose gender expression
challenges society's sex role expectations are particularly targeted for
violence." 21 Because schools tend to be viewed as a "microcosm[] of the
communities they serve[,]" 22 they often, in turn, "reflect the culture and

values of the dominant group in the school." 23 "[W]hen school officials
fail to protect a gender-nonconforming student from bullying, the child
is [essentially taught that] . . . 'the school-and by extension society as
[a] whole-condones such activity.", 2 4 On the other hand, when
teachers do intervene on behalf of bullied students, "studies show
that ...

victimized students report less harassment and [increased]

feelings of [safety at school]." 25 As such, schools, and consequently
state courts, have looked to their state legislatures to determine the
schools' appropriate course of action in dealing with transgender
students.26
In Part I of this Note, I outline the history of the fight for
transgender equality in the workplace by discussing which federal circuit
courts have been more or less receptive to a transgender plaintiff's claim
under Title VII. "Transgender individuals have been successful in
securing rights by arguing that they have experienced discrimination on
the basis of their gender nonconformity." 2 7 There seems to be a new
18. Id. at 37.
19. Id.
20. See Michael J. Higdon, To Lynch a Child: Bullying and Gender Nonconformity in Our
Nation's Schools, 86 IND. L.J. 827, 876-77 (2011).
21. Id. at 836 (quoting Joyce Hunter, Introduction:Safe Passage, 19 J. GAY & LESBIAN Soc.
SERVICES 1, 2 (2007)).
22. Id. (quoting ELIZABETH J. MEYER, GENDER, BULLYING, AND HARASSMENT: STRATEGIES
To END SEXISM AND HOMOPHOBIA IN SCHOOLS 23 (2009)).

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
399, 405

Id. (quoting MEYER, supranote 22, at 23).
Id. at 846 (quoting MEYER, supra note 22, at 5).
Id. at 847.
Id. at 867.
Stevie V. Tran & Elizabeth M. Glazer, Transgenderless, 35 HARVARD J.L. & GENDER
(2012) (footnote omitted); see generally Elizabeth M. Glazer & Zachary A. Kramer,
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requirement, however, that "employers be neutral as to the gender
category into which workers fall" despite a disconnection (or
"Although not
connection) with their actual biological sex. 2 8
unreasonable, the decision to require perfect gender-nonconformity as a
condition for obtaining relief in the event of gender identity
discrimination may have contributed to the disenfranchisement of the
transgender rights movement's youngest members .... "2 9
Much of the recent transsexual sex-discrimination case law,
examined below, is consistent with a reading of the sex stereotyping
prohibition as requiring a certain category of neutrality. 30 That is, the
transgender individual may present traits of the gender of his or her
choice, but these traits must be fixed. 3 ' This problematic discrepancy
has been recognized before:
The problem of adequately protecting sexual minorities under Title VII
lies in the courts' binary view of sex and gender, a view that identifies
men and women as polar opposites and that sees gender as naturally
flowing from biological sex. Without understanding that our current
binary concept of gender may be socially constructed and artificially
rigid rather than a natural result of biology, the law, even if it explicitly
protects persons based on sexual orientation and gender identity, may
fail to shelter from discrimination those workers it seeks to protect. 32
This rigid set of criteria is unworkable for the individual who
comes into work in a "frilly pink dress" 33 one day and a suit the next.
Individuals who seek fluidity in their gender identities-and who
simultaneously do not want to put their jobs at risk-are unwelcome in

Transitional Discrimination, 18 TEMP. -POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 651, 654-60 (2009)
(demonstrating, through the progression of transgender employment discrimination precedent from
1984 to 2008, that a claim of discrimination on the basis of gender-nonconformity was the only
reasonably reliable basis upon which transgender employees could bring successful sex
discrimination claims).
28. Kimberly A. Yuracko, Soul of a Woman: The Sex StereotypingProhibition at Work, 161
U. PA. L. REV. 757, 781 (2013).
29. Tran & Glazer, supra note 27, at 406.
30. See Yuracko, supra note 28, at 780.
31. See Tran & Glazer, supra note 27, at 400-03 (emphasis added) (arguing that courts do not
currently recognize the full range of choices that an individual may make regarding one's gender
but rather, that legal protection from discrimination on the basis of gender identity has been
reserved for perfect gender-nonconformists).
32. Ann C. McGinley, Erasing Boundaries: Masculinities, Sexual Minorities and
Employment Discrimination,43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 713, 715 (2010).
33. See Yuracko, supra note 28, at 778.
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the work environments of today. 34
Courts, however, seem to be more lenient when evaluating a
This is
plaintiffs discrimination claim within the school context.
notion
that
the
and
undisputed
interesting in light of the well-recognized
36
workplace is reminiscent of high school. I posit here that the goals of
the school environment and those of the work setting are not
inconsistent; what society generally thinks is reprehensible at school
might also be reprehensible and harmful at work. Thus, in Part II of this
Note I examine the recent victories transgender student plaintiffs have
achieved, both through the actions of state legislatures as well as within
the judicial system. The successes of these student plaintiffs may shed
light on this issue for transgender employees who are seemingly stuck in
uncomfortable and unwelcoming environments at work.
Part III of this Note then examines how these school cases might
provide the courts with a more flexible, broad standard with which to
assess a transgender employee's claims of discrimination against his or
her employer.
I. THE TRANSGENDER PLAINTIFF YESTERDAY AND TODAY

A. The CurrentLegal Standardfor Plaintiffs under Title VII
According to Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer "to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 37
Prior to Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court articulated a burden-shifting
framework for discrimination cases under Title VII in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green.38 Under the McDonnell Douglass approach,
the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination:
This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority;
(ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer
was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was

34. See Tran & Glazer, supra note 27, at 405-06, 419-20.
35. See infra Part II.
36. See WILMA DAVIDSON & JOHN F. DOUGHERTY, MOST LIKELY TO SUCCEED AT WORK:
HOW WORK IS JUST LIKE HIGH SCHOOL, at x (2003).

37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
38. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications. 39
In later cases, the Court has repeatedly held that by establishing a
prima facie case, the plaintiff has met his burden. 4 0 The burden then
shifts to the "respondent to 'produc[e] evidence that the plaintiff was
rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason."'41 The Court recognized that, "[o]n remand,
respondent must ...
be afforded a fair opportunity to show that
petitioner's stated reason for respondent's rejection was in fact
pretext.'A 2 "The 'ultimate question' in every Title VII case is whether
the plaintiff has proved that the defendant intentionally discriminated
against her because of a protected characteristic.'
Under Price Waterhouse, the Court held that:
once a plaintiff in a Title VII case shows that gender played a
motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a
finding of liability only by proving that it would have made the same
decision even if it had not allowed gender to play such a role.44
However:
an employer may not meet its burden in such a case by merely showing
that at the time of the decision it was motivated only in part by a
legitimate reason . . .. The employer instead must show that its
legitimate reason, standing alone, would have induced it to make the
same decision.45
In addition to this altered burden-shifting framework, Price
Waterhouse is notable because it expanded the scope of Title VII by
prohibiting employers from insisting that an individual possess or
exhibit certain traits or characteristics due to his or her group
membership.4 6 The Court's ruling also encompassed a prohibition on

39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000).
41. Id. (quoting Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)).
42. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804.
43. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 300 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing St. Mary's Honor
Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993)).
44. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-45 (1989) (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted).
45. Id. at 252.
46. See Yuracko, supranote 28, at 761, 764-65.
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ascriptive sex stereotyping: a situation in which the "employer assumes
that an individual possesses certain [sex-stereotypical] traits and
attributes . .. that render her unqualified for a particular position."47
The current standard, which at best is an unclear restatement of
Price Waterhouse, seems to greatly limit a plaintiffs options in
illustrating that he or she was a victim of sex stereotyping. 48 "In
practice, the sex stereotyping prohibition encourages plaintiffs to
endorse and adopt highly stereotyped gender packages in order to
convince courts of the steep costs associated with their forced gender
expression." 4 9 In other words, the plaintiff in a sex stereotyping case
must show that his or her gender nonconformity was so permanent and
obvious that the disparate treatment she endured had to have been a
result of sex stereotyping.so As such, Title VII seems to require a "stable
and workable definition of gender" despite the fact that "complete
gender freedom is incompatible" with any such definition.5
B. The EarlierTransgender Case Law
In Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., the Ninth Circuit refused to
allow a male-to-female transsexual individual to bring a Title VII claim
for sex discrimination. 52 "Holloway was first employed by Arthur
Andersen [and Company, an accounting firm,] in 1969" and at that time,
went by the name of Robert Holloway.53 Holloway began taking female
hormones a year later and in 1974 she informed her supervisor that she
would be undergoing anatomical sex reassignment surgery. 4 During
that year, Holloway had been promoted and given a pay raise.55 After
Holloway requested to have her records changed to reflect her new first
name, Ramona, she. was terminated.
Interestingly, in a footnote, the
court points to Holloway's supervisor's affidavit which "detailed many

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
employer

Id. at 763.
See id. at 761-64.
Id. at 761.
See id. at 763 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251).
Id at 771.
Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977). Holloway's
fired her after Holloway transitioned on the job. Id. at 661; see also Lee M. Peterson,

Workplace

Harassment Against

Transgender Individuals:

Sex

Discrimination,

Status

Discrimination,orBoth?, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 227, 227 (2002).
53. Holloway, 566 F.2d at 661.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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of the personnel problems created by appellant's transitional
appearance" such as the "red lipstick and nail polish, hairstyle, jewelry
and clothing." 57 Ms. Passard, her supervisor, "stated that Holloway was
not terminated because of transsexualism, 'but because the dress,
appearance and manner he was affecting were such that it was very
disruptive and embarrassing to all concerned.'"58
The question before the court was "whether an employee may be
discharged, consistent with Title VII, for initiating the process of sex
transformation."" The court examined Title VII's legislative history
and the concerns of Congress when the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
promulgated.6 0 In doing so, the court found that "the clear intent of the
1972 [amendment to Title VII] was to remedy the economic deprivation
of women as a class." 61 As such, the court concluded that "Congress had
only the traditional notions of 'sex' in mind" when it enacted these
amendments. 62 Because "Congress ha[d] not shown any intent other
than to restrict the term 'sex' to its traditional meaning[,]" the court
61
refused to "expand Title VII's application" in this case.
This narrow interpretation of Title VII was reinforced by the
Seventh Circuit in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.64 There, the court of
appeals reversed the district court's ruling in favor of the plaintiffemployee, holding that: (1) "Title VII does not protect transsexuals," and
(2) even if the transsexual was considered female, there were "no factual
findings ... to support his conclusion that Eastern discriminated against
her on this basis."6 5
In Ulane, Karen Ulane, formerly Kenneth, was hired by Eastern
Airlines in 1968 and logged over 8,000 flight hours. 66 "Ulane was
'diagnosed' [as] a transsexual in 1979" and "underwent 'sex
reassignment surgery"' in 1980.67

Eastern Airlines was unaware of

Ulane's transsexuality "until she attempted to return to work after her
reassignment surgery"; at this time, she was immediately fired.68 The

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 661 n.1.
Id.
Id. at 661.
See id. at 662.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 663.
Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085-87 (7th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1084, 1087.
Id. at 1082-83.
Id. at 1083.
Id. at 1082-83.
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court held that "[w]hile we do not condone discrimination in any form,
we are constrained to hold that Title VII does not protect transsexuals." 69
Its reasoning, like that of the Ninth Circuit in Holloway, rested primarily
on statutory construction and congress's intent in passing Title VII:
The words of Title VII do not outlaw discrimination against a person
who has a sexual identity disorder, i.e., a person born with a male body
who believes himself to be a female, or a person born with a female
body who believes herself to be .a male; a prohibition against
discrimination based on an individual's sex is not synonymous with a
prohibition against discrimination based on an individual's sexual
identiVt disorder or discontent with the sex into which they were
born.

C. Positive Outcomes for TransgenderPlaintiffs
In Smith v. City of Salem, the Sixth Circuit held that plaintiff,
Jimmie Smith, had been a victim of discrimination and that the Salem
Fire Department had violated Title VII.71 Jimmie Smith was suspended

from her job as a firefighter after informing her supervisors that she
intended to transition from male to female.72 Smith had been a
lieutenant in the Salem Fire Department in a small Ohio town and had
After
worked "for seven years without any negative incidents." 7
learning of her plans to transition genders, the department supervisors
conspired to get rid of Smith by requiring her to submit to three separate
psychological evaluations.74 They hoped this would induce Smith to
either resign or to refuse to follow the order.7 ' The latter would have
allowed the supervisors to terminate Smith for insubordination.76 Smith
learned of the department's plan and hired a lawyer who subsequently
informed the department of her legal representation and the potential
consequences of its plan.7 7 The department then suspended Smith, who
responded with a sex discrimination claim under Title VII against the

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 1084 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1085.
See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
See id. at 568-69.
Id. at 568.
See id. at 569.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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fire department.
The court held that "employers who discriminate against men
because they do wear dresses and makeup, or otherwise act femininely,
are also engaging in sex discrimination, because the discrimination
would not occur but for the victim's sex." 7 9 The court found Smith to be
a victim of discrimination because of her "gender non-conforming
behavior"80 and because of her identification as a transsexual, thus
'

qualifying her for coverage under Title VII.8

One year later, in Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, the Sixth Circuit
affirmed a jury finding of sex discrimination.82 The plaintiff, Philecia
Barnes, was a preoperative male-to-female transsexual police officer
who was denied a promotion to the position of sergeant because she
violated masculine stereotypes. 8 3 The court relied on its prior ruling in
Smith to hold "that a jury could have reasonably concluded that Barnes
was discriminated against because of her failure to conform to masculine
gender norms."8 4
Barnes's alleged lack of "command presence" seemed to present
the biggest problem for him during the probationary period required to
become a police sergeant. 85 It was a known fact among members of the
department that "[a]t the time of his promotion, Barnes was a male-tofemale transsexual who was living as a male while on duty but often
lived as a woman when off duty." 86 He had been assigned to a lieutenant
who "openly spoke about the number of lesbians in the [Department;
this lieutenant] did not believe he violated any policy by speaking about
the sexual orientation of female police officers while on duty."
Another lieutenant testified that when Barnes arrived in the new district
for his probationary period, people did not take him seriously because he
"had a French manicure, had arched eyebrows and came to work with
makeup or lipstick on his face on some occasions."88 After displaying
signs of stress, 89 "Barnes was placed in a new training program.... [It]

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id. at 574.
Id. at 575.
Id.
Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 733 (6th Cir. 2005).
See id. at 733.
Yuracko, supranote 28, at 766; see id. at 737.
See Barnes, 401 F.3d at 734.
Id. at 733.
Id. at 734.
Id.
See id. ("Within a month of Barnes's promotion, Lt. Wilger reported to the head of
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required Barnes's superiors to evaluate him on a daily basis over a three
month period." 90 "The program required seven other sergeants to rate
Barnes on a daily basis." 91 The sergeants required Barnes "to wear a
microphone at all times and ride in a car with a video camera during the
last weeks of his probation" period. 92 "No other sergeants were
evaluated in this manner." 9 3 "Sergeant Ford testified that '[t]he purpose
of the program was to scrutinize him and to document every mistake that
he made so that he could be failed on probation."' 94
The circuit court affirmed the district court's finding that Barnes
had proved a prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII. 95
Barnes had established that he was (1) "a member of a protected class";
(2) that he "had applied and was qualified for a promotion"; (3) that he
had been "considered for and [subsequently] denied [that] promotion;
and" (4) that "other employees of similar qualifications who were not
members of the protected class [had] received promotions." 96 The court
found that "Barnes produced sufficient evidence at trial to carry his
burden of proof' and this evidence showed that "the City's proffered
reason for demoting Barnes was false and that the real reason for his
demotions was unlawful discrimination." 9 7 The court reiterated its
decision in Smith that "a label, such as 'transsexual,' is not fatal to a sex
discrimination claim where the victim has suffered discrimination
because of his or her gender non-conformity." 9 8
In Schroer v. Billington, "the District Court for the District of
Columbia held that the Library of Congress had engaged in sex
discrimination by revoking its job offer to the plaintiff because she failed
to satisfy stereotypes of what a woman should look like." 99 In Schroer,
the plaintiff applied for and was offered a job as a terrorism specialist at
the Library of Congress while presenting herself as a man. 00 Shortly
after informing her new supervisor that she intended to begin work as a
District One, Captain ("Capt.") Demasi, that Barnes was having trouble fulfilling his duties. Lt.
Wilger noted that Barnes had trouble preparing documents, exercising proper judgment in the field
and completing assignments on time.").
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 736.
96. Id. at 736-37 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
97. Id. at 738.
98. Id. at 737 (citing Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004)).
99. Yuracko, supra note 28, at 768.
100. See Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 295-96 (D.D.C. 2008).
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woman and eventually obtain sex reassignment surgery, Schroer's offer
was revoked.'0o Specifically, when her new supervisor saw photographs
of Schroer in traditionally feminine attire, the supervisor admitted at trial
that when she saw these pictures she "saw a man in women's
clothing." 02 "The Library argue[d] that it had a number of nondiscriminatory reasons for refusing to hire Schroer, including concerns
about her ability to maintain or timely receive a security clearance, her
trustworthiness, and the potential that her transition would distract her
from her job."',03 "The Library also argue[d] that a hiring decision based
on transsexuality [was] not unlawful discrimination under Title VII."l 0 4
The judge not only found these arguments to be pretexts for
discrimination, but also that the Library's conduct, "whether viewed as
sex stereotyping or as discrimination literally 'because of. . . sex,"' did
in fact violate Title VII. 05 The court held that the Library's decision to
revoke Schroer's job offer was "infected by sex stereotypes"' 0 6 and thus
impermissible.
Similarly, in Glenn v. Brumby, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
judgment of the district court granting Glenn, a transgender woman,
summary judgment on the basis of her gender non-conformity. 07 Glenn
was hired as an editor in the Georgia General Assembly's Office of
Legislative Counsel (OLC) in 2005 while still presenting as a man.1os
"Brumby [was] the head of the OLC and [was] responsible for OLC
personnel decisions, including the decision to fire Glenn." 09 "In 2006,
Glenn informed her direct supervisor . .. [that she] was in the process of
becoming a woman."1 0 On Halloween of that year, "OLC employees
were permitted to come to work [in] costumes, Glenn came to work
presenting as a woman.""' Brumby told her that "her appearance was
not appropriate and asked her to leave the office."' 12 "Brumby stated
that 'it's unsettling to think of someone dressed in women's clothing
with male sexual organs inside that clothing,' and that a male in

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See id. at 296, 299.
Id. at 305.
Id at 300.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 305.
Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1321 (llthCir. 2011).
Id. at 1314.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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13

In the fall of 2007, Glenn informed her direct supervisor that she
would be moving forward with the gender transition and that she would
1 14
presenting at work as a woman and was also changing her legal name.
Brumby was notified and promptly terminated Glenn because "Glenn's
intended gender transition was inappropriate, that it would be disruptive,
that some people would view it as a moral issue, and that it would make
Glenn's coworkers uncomfortable."' 15
Unlike other plaintiffs, Glenn did not sue under Title VII per se, but
rather, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 1 6 The court looked to a different federal statute, § 1983,
to assess Glenn's claim: Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights."' The
statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress... .118
"In any § 1983 action, a court must determine 'whether the plaintiff
has been deprived of a "right secured by the Constitution and laws"' of
The court framed the issue as "whether
the United States." 1 9
discriminati[on] against someone on the basis of his or her gender nonconformity constitutes sex-based discrimination under the Equal
Protection Clause." 2 0 In holding that such discrimination violates the
Equal Protection Clause, the court cited Price Waterhouse and explained
that instances of discrimination against transgender plaintiffs specifically
"because they fail to act according to socially prescribed gender roles
constitute discrimination under Title VII according to the rationale of
Price Waterhouse." 2 1 Thus, the court held that "discrimination against

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1313, 1321.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); see id. at 1313.
42 U.S.C.§ 1983.
Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979)).
Id. at 1316.
Id. at 1317, 1320.
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a transgender individual because of her gender-nonconformity is sex
discrimination, whether it's described as being on the basis of sex or
gender."1 22

D. The Bathroom Issue
In Etsitty v. Utah TransitAuthority, the Tenth Circuit held that Title
VII does not extend to transsexual individuals.123 Etsitty was a preoperative male-to-female transsexual bus driver for the Utah Transit
Authority (UTA).1 24 Etsitty began dressing as a woman at work and was
fired due to concerns that she would use the women's restrooms while
she was still biologically a man. 1 2 5 "Soon after being hired, [Etsitty] met
with her supervisor [to inform him] that she was a transsexual" and that
she planned on eventually undergoing reassignment surgery.12' At the
time, her supervisor "expressed support for Etsitty and stated that he did
not see any problem with her being a transsexual."l 27 After this
discussion, "Etsitty began wearing makeup, jewelry, and acrylic nails to
work," and "[s]he also began using female restrooms."l1 2 8 "Shirley, the
operations manager of the UTA division where Etsitty worked, heard a
rumor that there was a male operator who was wearing makeup."' 29
Consequently, she held a meeting with Etsitty's direct supervisor who
informed her that Etsitty was a transsexual who planned on going
through a sex change.1 30

With this information, Shirley and a representative from Human
Resources met with Etsitty and asked her "where she was in the sex
change process and whether she still had male genitalia."' At this
point, "Etsitty explained that she still had male genitalia" only because
she could not yet afford the sex change operation.1 3 2 Shirley explained
to Etsitty that they were concerned about the possibility of liability for
UTA if she was observed using the female restroom even though she

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 1317 (emphasis added).
Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1218-19.
See id. at 1219, 1224.
Id. at 1219.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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still had male genitalia. 33 They were also worried that "Etsitty would
switch back and forth between using male and female restrooms." 34 As
a result of this meeting, Shirley and the human resources generalist
"placed Etsitty on administrative leave and ultimately terminated her
employment."13 5 They "explained to Etsitty that the reason for her
termination was UTA's inability to accommodate her restroom
needs."'36 "On the record of termination, Shirley indicated [that] Esitty
would [in fact] be eligible for rehire after completing [her] sex
reassignment surgery."' 37
The issue in this case concerned the pleading requirement for
raising a Title VII claim when the plaintiff is transgender.1 38 The court
concluded that the sex-stereotyping element is essential and agreed with
the district court that "transsexuals are not a protected class under Title
VII."'39 The court also noted that "[h]owever far Price Waterhouse
reaches, this court cannot conclude it requires employers to allow
biological males to use women's restrooms." 4 0 Simply alleging
discrimination based on transgender status will not permit a claim to
survive. 141 "[T]he plain language of the statute and not the primary
intent of Congress" guided the court's interpretation of Title VII.1 42 The
court explained that "[i]n light of the traditional binary conception of
sex, transsexuals may not claim protection under Title VII from
discrimination based solely on their status as a transsexual." 4 3

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1220-21.
Id. at 1220.
Id. at 1224.

141.

See DARRELL R. VANDEUSEN, 2008 EMERGING ISSUEs 793 In 53-54, 56 (Oct. 26, 2007),

available at LEXIS ("Unless you are in the Sixth Circuit, claiming that transgender is protected as
'sex' under Title VII will be an uphill, and possibly insurmountable, battle.... If you pursue a Title
VII transgender claim, frame it as a Price Waterhouse sex stereotype case, not simply as disparate
treatment because of transgender." The facts of the case must be "developed to establish that the
termination decision was based on the perception that Pat was not conforming to traditional gender
roles, and that her employer bowed to pressure from its customers.").
142. Etsitty, 502 F.3dat 1221.
143. Id. at 1222.
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E. EEOC Ruling in Macy v. Holder
"On December 9, 2011, [c]omplainant [Mia Macy] filed an appeal
concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint alleging
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964."144 Macy, a transgender woman, had been offered a
position with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
in San Francisco while still presenting as a man. 14 5 During the
background check required for the position, Macy informed her future
employer that she was in the "process of transitioning from male to
female."l 4 6 Five days later, Macy received an email that stated "due to
federal budget reductions, the position . .. was no longer available."1 4 7
Believing she had been incorrectly informed that the position had
been cut, Macy "filed [a] formal EEO complaint with the Agency....
stat[ing] that she was discriminated against on the basis of [her] 'sex,
gender identity (transgender woman) and on the basis of sex
stereotyping."' 1 48 Before this case, "claims of discrimination on the
basis of gender identity stereotyping [could not] be adjudicated before
the [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)]"; they had
to "be processed according to Department of Justice policy."l 49 The
Department of Justice had a "separate system for adjudicating
complaints of sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination by
its employees." 150 This option offered fewer remedies and, unlike
regular Title VII claims, did not "include the right to request a hearing
before an EEOC Administrative Judge or the right to appeal the final
Agency decision to the Commission."'"' Thus, the EEOC informed
Macy "that it would process only her claim 'based on sex (female)'
under Title VII" and that her "claim based on 'gender identity
stereotyping' would
be processed instead under the Agency's 'policy
52
and practice."'l
Macy argued that the EEOC not only had "jurisdiction over her
entire claim" but that "the Agency's 'reclassification' of her claim of
144.
2012).
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Macy v. Holder, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *1 (Apr. 20,
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
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discrimination into two separate claims" was a "'de facto dismissal' of
her Title VII claim of discrimination based on gender identity and
transgender status."15 3 Ultimately, Macy withdrew "her claim of
'discrimination based on sex (female),' as characterized by the
Agency .. . to pursue solely the Agency's dismissal of her complaint of
discrimination based on her gender identity." 54
As a result, the EEOC issued a formal ruling that "claims of
discrimination based on transgender status, also referred to as claims of
discrimination based on gender identity, are cognizable under Title VII's
sex discrimination prohibition, and may therefore be processed under
Part 1614 of EEOC's federal sector EEO complaints process."ss The
EEOC explained its decision by stating that the term "sex," as used in
Title VII, "encompasses both sex-that is, the biological differences
between men and women-and gender." 1 56 In addition, the Commission
clarified the use of Title VII in gender-based disparate treatment cases:
If Title VII proscribed only discrimination on the basis of biological
sex, the only prohibited gender-based disparate treatment would be
when an employer prefers a man over a woman, or vice versa. But the
statute's protections sweep far broader than that, in part because the
term "gender" encompasses not only a person's biological sex but also
the cultural and social aspects associated with masculinity and
femininity. 157

Federal courts are not strictly bound by EEOC decisions, however,
and the Supreme Court could overturn this particular interpretation of
sex-discrimination under Title VII if lower courts disagree. 5 8 Also, this
decision does not directly impact the fact that in many states it is still
legal to fire an employee because of his or her sexual orientation.1 5 9
F. Cases Since Macy
In Rice v. Deloitte Consulting LLP, plaintiff Danielle Rice, a
transgender woman, claimed that "she was discharged from her job as

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *5 (citing Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000)).
Id. at *6.
See Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 487 (1982) (Blackmun, S., dissenting).

159.

See Ashley E. McGovern, Macy v. Holder: Title VII and Workplace Justice for

TransgenderEmployees, JLPP (June 21, 2012, 8:01 AM), http://jlpp.org/blogzine/?p=843.
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Senior Manager .. . because .. . [of] her failure to conform to
60
The District Court for the
Defendant's preferred gender stereotypes."o
District of Colorado found that Rice failed to show she had been
terminated or discriminated against due to her gender nonconformity.' 6 1
In her complaint, Rice asserted that she was the target of
discrimination "from the moment [Deloitte] bought out her previous
employer, Bearing Point." 62 To support her argument, plaintiff asserted
"that Deloitte's employees 'were consistently concerned about her
appearance."" 63 An email between two colleagues stated that plaintiff
lacked "any shred of [p]rofessionalism. From unruly hair to a style of
dress that appeared disheveled. The impact was so great that Alan and I
debated asking her not to attend [a client meeting]." 6 4 In another email
plaintiff was described as being "unique/odd in her mannerisms, style
and interactions. . . 165
Defendant argued for summary judgment as to this claim because
Rice failed to present evidence that "supports a reasonable inference that
Deloitte discriminated against her . . based on her failure to conform to
stereotypical gender norms."' 66 The court quoted parts of Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins and Smith v. City of Salem to establish the legal
standard it used to assess Rice's claim:

Sex stereotyping based on a person's gender non-conforming behavior
has been held to be "impermissible discrimination, irrespective of the
cause of that behavior; a label, such as 'transsexual,' is not fatal to a
sex discrimination claim where the victim has suffered discrimination
because of his or her gender nonconformity." 67
The court provided numerous examples to show that the criticisms
of plaintiffs performance were directed at her "unprofessional
appearance, poor writing skills, and poor verbal communications and
client interactions," rather than her failure to conform to stereotypical
gender norms.168 Such examples include the fact that plaintiff "'clearly

160.
95439, at
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Rice v. Deloitte Consulting LLP, No. 12-cv-00253-WYD-KMT, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
*1 (D. Colo. July 9, 2013).
See id. at *15.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *16.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
Id. at *14.
Id. at *13 (citing Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004)).
Id. at *14.
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struggled' throughout her [oral] presentations-her delivery was found
to be 'weak' and on one occasion she was noted to have 'interjected
relatively forcefully with an irrelevant comment."' 1 69 Rice's colleagues
were also critical of her client calls, which were "poorly run and lacked
focus when she was lead senior manager."' 70 The court found these
criticism to be gender neutral and thus, unsupportive of a sex stereotype
discrimination claim. 7 ' In addition, the court found that the criticism's
regarding plaintiffs appearance were a reflection of Rice's "lack of
professionalism rather than the failure to be more feminine or conform
to a gender stereotype." 72 The court's rationale for this conclusion was
that Rice's colleagues' references to "unruly hair, a disheveled style of
dress or being unique/odd in mannerisms, style and interactions can be
attributed to anyone-male or female."' 7 3 The court reasoned that the
aforementioned comments, while certainly unflattering, were
nonetheless "gender neutral" and unsupportive of an inference that
plaintiff was terminated because of "failed gender stereotype
expectations." 1 74
In Hart v. Lew, the District Court for the District of Maryland
denied the defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff Sydney Hart's claim
of sex discrimination.' 75 Sydney Hart, a male-to-female transsexual,
sued the Department of the Treasury (the Department) for violating Title
VII by alleging sex discrimination and retaliation.' 76 Hart worked as a
revenue agent for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), a sub-agency of
the Department, but was discharged from her position on May 9,
2011.177
During the time Hart worked at the Department, she "filed
numerous complaints regarding various actions taken by her supervisors
and coworkers." 7 8 Hart's first complaint was based on an incident that
occurred on June 9, 2006 while Hart was still presenting as a male:
Hart's on-the-job instructor informed Hart that "his attire was not
appropriate for the office."' 7 9 After a meeting with Hart's first-line
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Id. at *15.
See id.
Id. at *16.
Id.

174. Id. at * 16-17.

175. See Hart v. Lew, 973 F. Supp. 2d 561, 565 (D. Md. 2013).
176. See id. at 564.
177. See id. at 565, 570.
178. Id. at 565.
179. Id.
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supervisor, "plaintiff voluntarily withdrew this first complaint." 80 After
a series of other filed and withdrawn EEO complaints, the "National
Treasury Employees Union ('NTEU') filed three grievances on

plaintiffs behalf in 2007 and 2008."181 The third grievance alleged that
management had "obstructed Plaintiffs promotional opportunities,"
which was denied by the territory manager.1 8 2
Hart "began Hormone Replacement Therapy in February 2009....
[and] changed her first name from Stuart to Sydney in March 2009.183
Hart explained to her supervisors that she had begun her transition from
male to female and asked for a key to the women's restroom so that she
would not have to use the men's restroom while wearing women's
clothing.1 8 4 She was denied this request.' 8 5 Hart appeared dressed as a
woman for the first time on April 1, 2009 and "surrendered her key to
the men's bathroom on April 15, 2009."l86 She was still, however,
denied access to the women's restroom by the Territory Manager
because she "still had male genitalia."' 87
In July of 2009, Hart still did not have access to the women's
restroom.1 88 At that time, "she was promoted to a new position [that]
required her to transfer from her post in Fairfax, Virginia to Baltimore,
Maryland."' 89 At this new location, she would be permitted to work
from home.1 90 However, in "late August and early September 2009,
[Hart] and her workgroup attended training workshops in Denver,
Colorado and Washington, D.C. . . . [where her colleagues] allegedly
ridiculed her, laughed at her appearance, and balked at her use of the
women's restroom."'91
Due to numerous ambiguous offhand comments from her
colleagues and supervisors, Hart entered into an agreement with the
Department that diversity training would be provided to her
workgroup.1 9 2 The training did not seem to improve the workplace

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id. at 565-66.
Id. at 567.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 568.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol32/iss2/5

20

Elmaleh-Sachs: Including the Transgenderless at Work: A Comparison of Transgende
2015]

INCLUDING THE TRANSGENDERLESS AT WORK

393

environment for Hart however as she continued to fear her supervisor
and preferred to work from home. 19 3 The Department informed Hart of
its decision to dismiss her on May 9, 2011.194 On May 31, 2011,
plaintiff contacted an EEO counselor and "proceeded to file a formal
complaint challenging the termination decision."' 95 On April 17, 2012,
the Department issued its Final Agency Decision finding that her
manager, Hansen, had made "discriminatory remarks but that plaintiffs
termination was not based on sex discrimination or retaliation."l 9 6 On
May 31, 2012, "Hart filed suit in the U.S. District Court [in] the District
of Columbia ... alleging employment discrimination in violation of
Title VII."l9 7 The case was transferred to the District of Maryland
because Hart "was working at the defendant's office in Baltimore,
part of the alleged misconduct occurred
Maryland when a substantial
19 8
fired."
was
she
when
and
The court applied the McDonnell Douglas pretext structure to
plaintiffs claim. 199 The court explained that in considering a motion to
dismiss, plaintiff need only make out a prima facie case which would
"allow the Court 'to draw the reasonable inference' that she was
discharged because of her sex, her status as a transsexual, and/or her
failure to conform with gender norms." 20 0 The court found that plaintiff
"has alleged facts sufficient to state a claim of sex discrimination in
employment that is plausible on its face" because her complaint was
"replete with allegations of incidents in which her supervisors made
improper remarks or took improper actions based on sex. 20 1 Moreover,
the court remarked that plaintiffs complaint "alleges that her
supervisors attempted to impede her gender transition in at least three
ways." 2 02 Thus, the court concluded that Hart had presented "allegations
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss." 20 3
Most recently, in Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, Inc., the
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia adopted the
magistrate judge's recommendation to deny defendant employer's

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

See id. at 569.
Id at 570.
Id.
Id.
Id at 571.
Id.
Id. at 580-81.
Id. at 580 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
Id. at 580-81.
Id at 581.
Id. at 582.
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motion to dismiss.204 Plaintiff first went to the EEOC office in Atlanta
after being terminated, allegedly due to her gender identity and
expression.20 5 When she went to the EEOC office, she brought along
handwritten notes describing a meeting "in which [p]laintiff and
[d]efendant's owner discussed [her] transition from male to female and
Defendant's owner's alleged request that [p]laintiff not wear certain
feminine clothing when coming to and leaving work." 2 06 After
consulting her supervisor, the EEOC investigator informed plaintiff that
because her transgender status was unprotected, she would be unable to
file a complaint.20 7
Eventually, "plaintiff returned to the EEOC office in Atlanta" and
was permitted to file a complaint against defendant employer.208
II. TRANSGENDER PLAINTIFFS AT SCHOOL

Schools are increasingly protecting transgender students from
harassment and discrimination as a result of progressive state laws that
either "specifically protect[] transgender students in public schools" or
that "classify public schools as public accommodations where gender
identity discrimination is prohibited."209 In addition, states that prohibit
gender identity discrimination in public schools (such as Connecticut,
Colorado, and Massachusetts) have released regulations or guidance
explaining what schools should do to protect and assist transgender
students.210 For example, schools may be required to update educational
records, allow access to the restroom of the transgender student's choice,
and enforce strong bullying prevention policies.211
In 2013, California passed a law that requires that students be
"permitted to participate in sex-segregated school programs and
activities, including athletic teams and competitions, and use facilities
consistent with his or her gender identity, irrespective of the gender
listed on the pupil's records."2 12 Prior to the bill's passage, many of the

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1350 (N.D.Ga. 2013).
Id. at 1338.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1338-39.

209.

Know Your Rights-Transgender People and the Law, AM. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION,

https://www.aclu.org/know-your-rights/transgender-people-and-law (follow "Circle 6" hyperlink)
(last visited May 17, 2015).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Cal. Assemb. B. 1266, 2013-2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (emphasis added) available at
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state's nearly 1,000 school districts "separated transgender students from
their peers or required them to enroll in and attend classes that conflicted
with their gender identity." 2 13
A. Bullying on the Basis of Sexual Orientationor Perceived Sexual
Orientation
Studies of LGBT children reveal that approximately thirty-one
percent "report having missed at least one day of school in the previous
month" because they were scared to go to. school.2 14 Courts across the
country have been grappling with bullying on the basis of sexual
orientation or gender nonconformity in the last few decades.2 15
In Montgomery v. Independent School Dist. No. 709, the District
Court of Minnesota held that the school district was not entitled to
summary judgment on claims relating to plaintiffs sexual harassment
during the eleven years of education he received in defendant's
schools.2 16 Between kindergarten and tenth grade, and recurring on an
almost daily basis, plaintiff was teased and harassed due to his perceived
sexual orientation. 21 Some of the taunts used against him included:
"femme boy," ".gayboy," "bitch," "queer," "pansy," and "queen."2 18 In
addition, he was often punched, kicked, sexually grabbed, and even
thrown to the floor by other students. 2 19 In order to avoid harassment,
plaintiff stayed home from school five or six times. 220 Eventually, after
finishing the tenth grade, plaintiff "transferred to another school district
altogether." 2 2 1
Defendant School District sought dismissal as to plaintiffs claims
of discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA)
because prior to August 1, 1993, the MHRA "explicitly prohibited only
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill-id=201320140AB 1266.
213.

Sarah McBride, California'sNew Protectionsfor TransgenderStudents, CENTER FOR AM.

PROGRESS
(Aug.
23,
2013),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/1gbt/news/2013/08/23/72800/califomias-new-protectionsfor-transgender-students/.

214. See Scott Hirschfeld, Moving Beyond the Safety Zone: A Staff Development Approach to
Anti-Heterosexist Education, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 611, 612 (2001).
215. See infra Part IIA-B.
216. Montgomery v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1095 (D. Minn.
2000).
217. Id. at 1084.
218. Id.
219. See id. at 1084-85.
220. Id. at 1085.
221. Id. at 1086.
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discrimination 'because of race, color, creed, religion, national origin,
sex, age, marital status, [or] status with regard to public assistance or
disability."' 2 22 The students who bullied plaintiff targeted him mainly
because of his perceived sexual orientation, and thus defendant
concluded that the plaintiff did not state a claim for relief under the
MHRA.2 23 The court disagreed explaining that "although the MHRA
did not prohibit sexual orientation discrimination prior to 1993, it did
prohibit discrimination based on sex" 2 24 and that such discrimination
included "sexual harassment." 2 25
From the 1990s to the early 2000s, numerous similar cases arose in
which courts refused to grant defendant school districts summary
judgment that were based on arguments that plaintiffs failed to allege
226
In many of these
facts sufficient to support a claim of discrimination.
cases, the plaintiff student was tormented on a regular basis by his
peers.227 Teachers and administrators were generally unhelpful at
best, 22 8 or encouraged the bullying at worst. 22 9

The courts were not

sympathetic to this habitual inaction on the part of the school districts.230
Such disapproving verdicts "not only provide a remedy for the discrete
222. Id. at 1087. The MHRA was amended on August 1, 1993 "to include 'sexual orientation'
as a prohibited basis for discrimination." Id. (citing 1993 Minn. Laws, ch. 22, §§ 8-25).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 363.01 (1993)).
226. See, e.g., Patterson v. Hudson Area Schs., 551 F.3d 438, 439 (6th Cir. 2009) (concluding
that the plaintiffs demonstrated that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
school district's responses to plaintiffs reported student-on-student sexual harassment were clearly

unreasonable); Doe v. Southeastem Greene Sch. Dist., 2006 U.S. Dist LEXIS 12790, at *30 (W.D.
Pa. Mar. 24, 2006) (denying defendant school district's motion for summary judgment as to
plaintiff's claim of discrimination on the basis of sex under Title IX); Ray v. Antioch Unified Sch.
Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1166-67, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that plaintiff, the son of a
transgender female, had stated a cause of action for sex discrimination under Title IX by alleging
that he was harassed at school due to other students' perception that he was a homosexual, and due
to his mother's physical appearance, and that defendant is not entitled to judgment as a mater of

law).
227. Patterson,551 F.3d at 439.
228. Id. ("DP reported at least some of these instances to the school and was told 'kids will be
kids, it's middle school."').
229. Id. at 440 ("The Pattersons learned from DP that he had been assaulted at school. This
incident led to further teasing, including teasing from geography teacher John Redding, who asked
DP later that same day in front of a full class of students: '[H]ow does it feel to be hit by a
girl[?]' .. . The class laughed at DP.").
230. See, e.g., Antioch, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 1170 ("The agents and employees of Defendant
Antioch Unified School District took no action to curtail the harassing conduct of Defendant
Jonathon Carr, when they knew or should have known he presented a specific threat to Plaintiffs

safety.... Taking these allegations as true, Plaintiff has established that Defendant Antioch Unified
School District acted with deliberate indifference.").
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plaintiff but can also serve as a call to action to other school districts,
thus ultimately benefiting a number of both actual and potential
3
Vi iMS,,231
victims.

B. Recent Decisions on the Basis of Gender Nonconformity
The more recent cases courts are deciding address the issue of how
schools can best make transgender students feel comfortable at school.
In 2001, a Massachusetts Superior Court ruled that a middle school
may not prohibit a transgender student from wearing clothes that she
feels most comfortable in simply because she was born biologically
male. 2 32 In early 1999, when plaintiff was in seventh grade, she began to
"express her female gender identity by wearing girls' make-up, shirts,
and fashion accessories to school."233 The school had a dress code that
prohibited "clothing which could be disruptive or distractive to the
educational process or which could affect the safety of students."234 On
this basis, the principal would often send the plaintiff home to change
her clothes if she came to school dressed in typical female attire.235 On
some occasions, plaintiff would simply stay at home because she was
too upset to return to school.236
Plaintiff returned to school as an eighth grader the following year
and was instructed by the principal to check into his office every day so
that he could approve her appearance. 2 37 Again, plaintiff would often be
sent home to change; she sometimes came back to school in different
clothes and sometimes she just stayed at home. 2 38 During the 1999-2000
school year, plaintiff ceased to go to school entirely due to the hostile
environment she felt the principal had created. 2 39 As a result of these
absences, plaintiff had to repeat the 8h grade.240 Plaintiff was also
suspended three times for using the women's restroom after expressly

231. Higdon, supra note 20, at 864-65.
232. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits, 001 060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at * 1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11,
2000), affd Doe v. Brockton Sch. Comm., 2000-J-638, 2000 WL 33342399 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov.
30, 2000).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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being told not to. 2 4 1 Ultimately, the principal and the Senior Director for
Pupil Personnel Services met with plaintiff and informed her that she
would not be allowed to return to school the following year if she
continued to "wear any outfits disruptive to the educational process,
specifically padded bras, skirts or dresses, or wigs." 24 2
Plaintiff filed a claim requesting a preliminary injunction
prohibiting defendants from excluding her from South Junior High
School, on the basis of the plaintiff's sex, disability, or gender identity
24
The court thoroughly analyzed plaintiffs argument
and expression.243
and defendants' contention in its decision that plaintiff had indeed been
impermissibly discriminated against on the basis of sex:
Plaintiff contends that defendants' action constitute sex discrimination
because defendants prevented plaintiff from attending school in
clothing associated with the female gender solely because plaintiff is
male. Defendants counter that, since a female student would be
disciplined for wearing distracting items of men's clothing, such as a
fake beard, the dress code is gender-neutral. Defendants' argument
does not frame the issue properly. Since plaintiff identifies with the
female gender, the right question is whether a female student would be
disciplined for wearing items of clothes plaintiff chooses to wear. If
the answer to that question is no, plaintiff is being discriminated
against on the basis of her sex, which is biologically male. Therefore,
defendants' reliance on cases holding that discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation, transsexualism, and transvestism are not
controlling in this case because plaintiff is being discriminated against
because of her gender.244
In conclusion, the court held that it could not "allow the stifling of
plaintiffs selfhood merely because it causes some members of the
community discomfort." 24 5 It then went on to quote the dissenting
opinion of Justice Harlan in the landmark case Plessy v. Ferguson: "Our
constitution ... neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." 246
Thus, the court essentially compares plaintiffs treatment at school to
that of African Americans under segregation.247 This comparison

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *7.
Id. (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See id.
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highlights the court's view that plaintiffs isolation at school is
impermissible.248
In Doe v. Regional School Unit 26, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine held that the "school [had] violated the Maine Human Rights Act
(MHRA) and discriminated against [the] transgender student .. . when it
prohibited [the] student from using the girls' communal bathroom and
required her to use the unisex staff bathroom." 2 49 Susan Doe, the
plaintiff, is a transgender teenage girl who used the girls' restroom at her
school without any disturbance until the start of the fifth grade when a
male student, following his grandfather's instructions, followed her into
the bathroom. 250 The student had been directed by his grandfather to use
the girls' restroom "as long as Susan used it." 2 5 1 The staff subsequently
required her to use a staff-only designated restroom.2 52 No other
students beside Susan used this restroom. 25 3
The Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD) filed suit
against the Orono School Department Superintendent and other school
district entities on behalf of Susan and her family in May 2011 putting
forth counts of "discrimination in education and public accommodation,
harassment, and infliction of emotional distress." 2 54 On November 20,
2012 the Maine Superior Court (the trial court) granted summary
judgment for the defendants. 2 5 5 GLAD appealed this decision in March
of 2013 before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.256 The appellants'
brief alleged violations of the MHRA, which bans "a school from
treating a transgender girl differently from every other girl."25 7 The
MHRA prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in
educational institutions and public accommodations.2 58 Specifically, it is
unlawful education discrimination on the basis of sex and a violation of
a civil right to, "[e]xclude a person from participation in, deny a person
the benefits of, or subject a person to, discrimination in any academic,
248.
249.

See id.
Doe v. Reg'1 Sch. Unit 26, 86 A.3d 600, 600 (2014).

250. Sherry F. Colb, A Restroom of One's Own: The Maine Supreme Court Considers A
Transgender Student's Exclusion From the Girls' Bathroom, VERDICT (June 26, 2013),

http://verdict.justia.com/2013/06/26/a-restroom-of-ones-own.
251. Id.
252. Reg'l Sch. Unit 26, 86 A.3d at 603.
253. Id.
254. Doe v. Clenchy, GLAD (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.glad.org/work/cases/doe-v.-clenchy.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Brief of Appellants John and Jane Doe as Parents and Next Friend of Susan Doe at 17,
Doe v. Clenchy, 2011 Me. Super. LEXIS 70 (Me. Sup. Jud. Ct. 2013) (No. PEN-12-582).
258. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4601-4602 (2013); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 5, § 4591 (2005).
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extracurricular, research, occupational training or other program or
activity." 259
On January 30, 2014, a six-panel court found that the school district
had in fact violated the MHRA and vacated the decision of the lower
court. 26 0 The court remarked that although school buildings must,
pursuant to a state statute on sanitary facilities (section 6501), have
separate bathrooms for each sex, the statute "does not-and school
officials cannot-dictate the use of the bathrooms in a way that
In
discriminates against students in violation of the MHRA."26 1
sex-separated
in
mandating
statute,
that
the
noted
court
addition, the
facilities, does not suggest any manner in which transgender students
should be treated.262 The court held that the type of discrimination
Susan endured as a result of her transgender status "is forbidden by the
MHRA and it is not excused by the school's compliance with section
6501."263
A similar situation arose recently in Colorado where Coy Mathis, a
6-year-old biologically male child who identifies as a girl, was told "she
could no longer use the girls' bathroom ... but instead [had to] use a
gender-neutral restroom." 26 4 A lawyer for the Fountain-Fort Carson
school district explained in a letter that, "as Coy grows older and his
male genitals develop along with the rest of his body, at least some
parents and students are likely to become uncomfortable with his
continued use of the girls' restroom." 2 65
Colorado's anti-discrimination law "expanded protections for
transgender people in 2008.",266 "According to the Transgender Legal
filed a complaint with
Defense and Education Fund, which ...
Colorado's civil rights division on the Mathises' behalf, [sixteen] states
and the District of Columbia offer some form of legal protections for
transgender [individuals] .267
259.

ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5,

§ 4602(1)(A)

(1985); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5,

§ 4601

(declaring sexual orientation a civil right).
260. Doe v. Reg'l Sch. Unit 26, 86 A.3d 600, 606 (2014).
261. See id. at 606; see also ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 20-A, § 6501(1)(B) (2008) ("A school
administrative unit shall provide clean toilets in all school buildings, which shall be ... [s]eparated
according to sex and accessible only by separate entrances and exits[.]").

262.
263.
264.

(Mar.

Reg'l Sch. Unit 26, 86 A.3d at 606.
Id.
Dan Frosch, Dispute on Transgender Rights Unfolds at Colorado School, N.Y. TIMES

17,

2013),

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/18/us/in-colorado-a-legal-dispute-over-

transgender-rights.html?_r-0.

265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
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In June of 2013, the Colorado Civil Rights Division rendered a
verdict on the Mathis family's complaint against Coy's school.268
Director Steven Chavez decided in Coy's favor, allowing her to use the
girls' restroom, and admonishing the school district's treatment of Coy:
"Telling [Coy] that she must disregard her identity while performing one
of the most essential human functions . . creates an environment that is
objectively and subjectively hostile."269 Chavez added that "the school's
rationale behind forcing Coy to use a different
bathroom is 'reminiscent
270
of the "separate but equal" philosophy."'
III. WHAT CAN THE STUDENTS TEACH THE ADULTS?

Mia Macy commenting on her win said, "I never thought in my life
that it would be over, but to have it not only be over but to have them
say, 'yes, unfortunately, your civil rights were violated. They did do
this.' To have that vindication, it's surreal." 2 7 1
A. The Double-Bind as Applied in the Aforementioned Cases
In the earlier cases examined above, Holloway and Ulane, the
transgender plaintiffs were unsuccessful under Title VII because the
Ninth and Seventh Circuits, respectively, found that Congress did not
intend to protect transgender individuals in its passage of Title VII. 27 2
Both courts reasoned that the "personnel problems"

273

created by the

plaintiffs' transitional appearance outweighed any discrimination that
the individuals might face due to their "discontent with the sex into
which they were born."274
Then came the Price Waterhouse decision in 1989. "After Price
Waterhouse, transgender employees began basing their discrimination
claims not on their transgender status-a basis which had proved

268.

Sabrina Ruben Erdely, About A Girl: Coy Mathis' Fight to Change Gender, ROLLING

STONE (Oct. 28, 2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/about-a-girl-coy-mathis-fight-to-

change-change-gender-20131028?page=5.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271.

Chris Geidner,

Federal Government Decisions Mark A

Changed Landscape for

Transgender Workers, BuzZFEED (July 15, 2013), http://www.buzzfeed.com/chrisgeidner/federalgoverment-decisions-mark-a-changed-landscape-for-tra.

272.
273.
274.

See supraPart II.
See supraPart II.
See supraPart II.
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unsuccessful in Ulane-but instead on their gender-nonconformity." 275
It was not until 2004, however, that the first big transgender win came
down in Smith. In Smith, the Sixth Circuit Court found the plaintiff to
be a victim of discrimination because of his "gender non-conforming
conduct" 276 and "because of his identification as a transsexual", thus
qualifying her for coverage under Title VII. 277 In fact, it was "[o]nly by
assuming that Smith's sex [was] male could the court could determine
that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her 'gender nonconforming behavior."' 2 78 Smith is likely to have a successful Title VII
claim because she is the "perfect gender-nonconformist."2 79
Unfortunately, this "neat mismatch between sex and gender" 280 not only
"obscures the complexity of... transgenderism[,]" 281 but seems to
create a new category exclusive to perfect transgender people. 282
Thus, the plaintiffs in the more recent cases have exhibited a variety
of issues in attempting to adjudicate their claims.2 83 In Rice v. Deloitte
Consulting, the plaintiff, who exhibited "unruly hair, a disheveled style
of dress" and odd "mannerisms, style and interaction," 284 was not the
perfect gender non-conformist. 285 The court reasoned that such qualities
"can be attributed to anyone-male or female." 2 86
In deciding that gender (or gender nonconformity) did not play a
motivating part in employer Deloitte Consulting's decision to discharge
Rice, the court seems to circumvent the possible inference that Rice's
colleagues were so critical of her appearance and mannerisms precisely
because of her gender nonconformity.2 87 As noted above, men who

275. Glazer & Kramer, supra note 27, at 656 (footnote omitted).
276. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 571 (2004).
277. Id.
278. Tran & Glazer, supranote 27, at 419 (citing Smith, 378 F.3d at 575).
279. See id. at 421-22.
280. Id at 419.
281. Id.
282. See id. at 420-21 (providing a discussion of sexless and genderless cases).
283.

See supra Part I.F.

284. See supra notes 160, 165 and accompanying text.
285. See, e.g., Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 734 (2005) (providing an example of
a perfect gender conformist). "Barnes was living off-duty as a woman, had a French manicure, had
arched eyebrows and came to work with makeup or lipstick on his face on some occasions." Id.
286. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
287. See Rice v. Deloitte Consulting LLP, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95439, at *16-17 (D. Colo.
July 9, 2013) ("Moreover, the references to unruly hair, a disheveled style of dress or being
unique/odd in mannerisms, style and interactions can be attributed to anyone-male or female.
While these comments may be unflattering, they are gender neutral and do not support a reasonable
inference that Deloitte terminated Plaintiff because of her gender or because of failed gender
stereotype expectations.").
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exhibit feminine qualities tend to be doubly despised "for manifesting
the disfavored qualities" 288 deemed feminine and for "descending from
[their] masculine gender privilege to do so.",289 As such, the court
seemed to ignore the possibility that Rice was harshly scrutinized by her
supervisors, at least in part, due to their discomfort with her gender
identity. In addition, it is possible that because her gender identity did
not seem to be set in stone, her colleagues struggled with the threat of
uncertainty she posed.2 90
Similarly, in Hart v. Lew, plaintiff, appearing dressed as a woman
but "still ha[ving] male genitalia," was repeatedly denied access to the
women's restroom. 291 In addition, plaintiffs colleagues made her feel
uncomfortable and nervous on numerous occasions. One instance is
particularly telling:
[O]n October 6, 2010, Hansen allegedly criticized the length of
plaintiffs skirt, chastised her for contacting NTEU and EEO
counselors, and said, "'Why don't you just resign?"' According to
plaintiff, Hansen's tone, body language, and facial expressions made
her "afraid and fearful." After the meeting, plaintiff left Hansen's
office, notified him that she was feeling sick, and returned to her home.
Hansen denied Hart's request for a sick day, instead charging her with
6.5 hours of "AWOL."29
The court in this case is sympathetic to plaintiff Hart. 9 The court
took note of Hart's allegations of "animus and hostility regarding her
appearance, dress, sex, and gender transition,"294 and expressly stated
that while it "may ultimately be persuaded by evidence supporting
defendant's explanation[,]" it still denied the defendant's motion to
dismiss.2 95
In Chavez, the court used indifferent language regarding plaintiffs
mistakes in filing EEOC complaints:
The November Meeting Notes describe a meeting, nearly two months
288.
289.

Supra note II and accompanying text.
Supra note 12 and accompanying text.

290. See Zachary A. Kramer, The New Sex Discrimination,63 DUKE L.J. 891, 916 (2014). This
is unlike the plaintiff in Smith who had to take on a male identity, "namely, as a man who wanted to
participate in the workplace dressing and looking like a woman." Id.
291. Hart v. Lew, 973 F. Supp. 2d 561, 567 (D. Md. 2013).
292. Id. at 569.
293. Id at 582.
294. Id.
295. Id.
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before Plaintiffs termination, between plaintiff and Defendant's
owner. The Separation Notice and the November Meeting Notes do
not state that Plaintiff was terminated for a discriminatory reason, and
they do not manifest Plaintiffs intent for the EEOC to investigate a
charge of discrimination or to inform Defendant of such a charge. 96
If the court held any sympathy for the plaintiff in this case, it is
very difficult to discern.
B. The Students as Plaintiffs
In the cases examined above in Part II B, the courts came down
hard on the schools, using language reminiscent of courts admonishing
the "separate but equal" philosophy.297 Notably, the plaintiffs in both
the bullying cases and the transgender bathroom cases were granted
much wider latitude with respect to their rights. 2 9 8 The courts were
sympathetic to the plight of these students regardless of how "perfectly"
they presented their respective genders. 2 99
For example, student
plaintiffs who were bullied due to their perceived homosexual sexual
orientation won their claims.30 0
More recently, transgender plaintiffs have garnered the support of
their families and peers. 3 0 1 They have also looked to state specific
statutes regarding human rights in their complaints of discrimination on
the basis of sex.302 Most remarkable, however, is the courts' strong
support and encouragement of the transgender students. The disparity in
language between the courts' opinions in these cases and those in the
aforementioned employee-employer cases is evident.

296.
297.

Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1341 (2013).
See Erdely, supra note 268.

298.

See supraPart II.

299. See supra Part II; see also Logan v. Gary Cmty. Sch. Corp., 2008 WL 4411518, at *1, 5
(N.D. Ind. Sept. 25, 2008) (denying defendant School District's Motion to Dismiss where plaintiff,
a young male-to-female transgender individual, wore girls' apparel to school throughout the year,
and a dress to prom).

300.

See, e.g., Ray v. Antioch Unified Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1165-67, 1171 (N.D.

Cal. 2000) (holding that defendant was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because plaintiff,
the son of a transgender female, stated a cause of action for sex discrimination under Title IX by
alleging that he was harassed at school due to other students' perception that he was a homosexual,
and due to his mother's physical appearance).
301. See generally Erdely, supra note 268.

302.

See supra notes 257-61 and accompanying text.
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C. A Possible Solutionfor Imperfect TransgenderEmployees
Mia Macy commented on possible solutions for transgender
employees:
I think in the workplace, if employers have to step up and they're the
ones to tell people, "It's OK, these people are allowed to work with us.
They're just like you and me. They're fine," and the employers start
accepting that, I think the people take that with them home . . . It's a
piece of the puzzle. I am happy that I got to be a part of taking down a
wall-one more wall.303
In order to resolve some cases in the workplace that seem to be
adjudicated at least arguably improperly, courts may want to consider
bullying in the school context. The precise reasons why strong measures
against bullying and discrimination are enforced in schools disappear in
the workplace context. Perhaps if courts did take seriously the notion
that transgender plaintiffs-both perfect and imperfect-might feel
bullied or, at the very least, uncomfortable in their work environments,
they may be able to glean some helpful insight. 30 4
In addition, it is clear that "teachers can play a significant and
positive role when they model empathy and acceptance of individual
differences and when they establish a classroom atmosphere where
bullying, taunting, and teasing . . . are not tolerated."305
As such, perhaps the solution is two-fold. Step one must take place
in the workplace context itself: employers and colleagues with relatively
higher positions of power should be encouraged to emulate teachers by
treating employees who are facing challenges (that may be) related to
their gender identity with more compassion and sympathy. Perhaps if
teachers and administrators defended or supported the mistreated
students in cases above, the students were more likely to continue
coming to school and felt a greater sense of safety and comfort in the
school environment.
Secondly, the courts should look to their analyses in cases where
the plaintiffs are students. Whether they are being bullied due to their
gender nonconformity or perceived sexual orientation, or whether they

303. Geidner, supra note 271.
304. See e.g., Hart v. Lew, 973 F. Supp. 2d 561, 569 (D. Md. 2013) (describing plaintiffs
negative feelings about coming into work because she had been made to feel so unwelcome at the
office).
305.

JEAN M. BAKER, How HOMOPHOBIA HURTS CHILDREN 40 (2001).
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are simply challenging antiquated school policies, student plaintiffs have
had an easier time persuading judges to step into their shoes. 306 By
evaluating these cases, the courts may be able to shed light on issues
concerning employees who are singled out for similar reasons. Courts
should also look to the EEOC's interpretation of Title VII as an
indication of the federal government's desire to consider transgender
plaintiffs' claims as seriously as any other discrimination claims.307
The combination of both of these remedial measures may lead to a
more tailored and flexible standard for courts to consider in this
employee-employer context. More importantly, the work environment
will be a better place for all employees when a transgender plaintiff does
not feel that his or her only means of redress is to file mass EEO
complaint.
As our society becomes increasingly accepting and open-minded, it
is nonetheless crucial to remember that bullying is still prevalent and
that qualities associated with masculinity remain in high esteem as
compared with characteristics associated with femininity.
The
workplace itself is where most adults spend the majority of their time; it
is thus necessary that this environment be as welcoming and accepting
as possible. Naturally, employers cannot control the socialization and
deeply rooted preconceived notions of their employees. Courts can,
however, influence the workplace to become a more accepting
environment by empathizing with individuals who are facing challenges
related to their gender identity. As Justice Brennan noted in the majority
opinion of Price Waterhouse:
It is not our job to review the evidence and decide that the negative
reactions to Hopkins were based on reality; our perception of Hopkins'
character is irrelevant. We sit not to determine whether Ms. Hopkins is
nice, but to decide whether the partners reacted negatively to her
personality because she is a woman.308

306. See supra Part II.
307. See supra Part I.E.
308. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989).
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It is the role of the judiciary, after all, to ensure that justice is dealt
and that no one is being treated unfairly for reasons outside of his or her
control.
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